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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MIXED MOTIVES AND MOTIVATING FACTORS: CHOOSING A
REALISTIC SUMMARY JUDGMENT FRAMEWORK FOR
§ 2000E-2(M) OF TITLE VII

INTRODUCTION
Imagine, right now, an employee or job applicant somewhere in the United
States who has recently experienced discrimination at the hands of an
employer, at least partly on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national
origin.1 This hypothetical protagonist is reasonably well-informed and decides
to seek redress in a court of law. Eventually, the parties reach the stage of
summary judgment, by which time the plaintiff has elected to proceed under
the motivating factor (“mixed-motive”) theory created by the Civil Rights Act
of 1991.2 Further, as in most cases, the plaintiff offers circumstantial (rather
than direct) evidence to support the claim.3
When anticipating the employer’s motion for summary judgment, the
plaintiff’s attorney might believe that her basic task is to show that the plaintiff
was the object of an adverse employment decision and that the plaintiff’s

1. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, these are all protected characteristics
upon which most employers cannot legally base an adverse employment decision. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). But in reality, our hypothetical employee or job applicant would be just
one of many people who find or perceive themselves to be the victim of such a decision. In 2008,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) received over 69,000 formal
complaints under Title VII, though some of the complaints were concurrently filed under other
antidiscrimination statutes. THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, TITLE
VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT of 1964 CHARGES: FY 1997–FY 2007, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/titlevii.cfm.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
3. “Direct evidence of discrimination is evidence that, ‘if believed, proves the existence of
a fact in issue without inference or presumption.’” Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1266
(11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Burrell v. Bd. of Trs. of Ga. Military Coll., 125 F.3d 1390, 1393 (11th
Cir. 1997)). By contrast, circumstantial evidence only suggests a discriminatory motive. See id.;
Amrhein v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 546 F.3d 854, 858 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lewis v. Sch.
Dist. #70, 523 F.3d 730, 742 (7th Cir. 2008) (echoing the Eleventh Circuit’s definition of direct
evidence and describing circumstantial evidence as that “which allows the trier of fact to infer
intentional discrimination . . . typically through a longer chain of inferences”)). Employment
discrimination complaints based on direct, rather than circumstantial, evidence are comparatively
rare because “direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come by.” Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), as recognized in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539
U.S. 90, 94–95 (2003); see also Kline v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 348 (6th Cir. 1997).
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protected characteristic was a “motivating factor” in that decision.4 More
precisely, to avoid summary judgment under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, she would need to show that genuine issues of material fact
remained with regard to the adverse employment decision and the
discriminatory motivating factor.5 Yet, in four federal circuits, the attorney
would be partially wrong.6 In at least five other circuits, the attorney could not
be sure which framework the court might apply.7
Notwithstanding the plain language of § 2000e-2(m), the federal appellate
courts have split over the question of which framework to apply at summary
judgment to claims brought under § 2000e-2(m), when supported by
circumstantial evidence. In the larger context of Title VII litigation, the
existence of such an inconsistency is perhaps unsurprising. More than one
conflict in this fractured area of law has resisted resolution.8 The struggle to
identify the correct summary judgment framework for a § 2000e-2(m)
circumstantial evidence claim is only one problem, but it is a particularly
pressing one.9 Fortunately, this question has at last met a realistic answer,
embodied in a 2008 decision by the Sixth Circuit.10

4. See § 2000e-2(m) (“Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though
other factors also motivated the practice.”).
5. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
6. See discussion infra Parts II, III for a detailed overview of the frameworks utilized by the
federal circuits.
7. The court might not know either. The First, Second, Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits
have not taken a position on this issue, as noted in White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d
381, 399 (6th Cir. 2008).
8. See discussion infra Part II. For example, the circuits were once split over the direct
evidence requirement described in Part II. See discussion infra Part II. The Ninth Circuit
described the debate over that issue as a “quagmire,” “morass,” and the spawning point for a
“cottage industry of litigation.” Costa v. Desert Palace, 299 F.3d 838, 851, 853 (9th Cir. 2002).
Similarly, the Supreme Court remarked in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins that the mixed-motive
issue had “to say the least, left the Circuits in disarray.” Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, 238 n. 2 (1989) (plurality opinion), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), as recognized in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94–95 (2003).
9. Jaclyn Borcherding, Note, Deserting McDonnell Douglas? Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,
57 BAYLOR L. REV. 243, 262 (2005) (“The summary judgment stage is critical because it is
where most employment discrimination cases are either won or lost.”). For plaintiffs in
employment discrimination cases, surviving pretrial adjudication (like a summary judgment
motion) is a tough battle. A study in 2004 found that defendants in such cases win over twentytwo percent of pretrial adjudication in federal courts, compared to just over four percent for
plaintiffs. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs
Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 444 (2004). Approximately 70% of
the cases surveyed were brought under Title VII. Id.
10. White, 533 F.3d at 381.
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Part I of this Comment will provide a brief historical overview of the issue.
Part II will unravel and critique the frameworks (mainly, the iterations of the
McDonnell Douglas framework) favored by the circuits.11 Part III will focus
on the Sixth Circuit’s new “motivating factor” framework and its rationale.
Part IV will offer additional reasons supporting the Sixth Circuit’s decision,
based on social-psychological studies of discriminatory behavior.
I. TITLE VII TO DESERT PALACE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE MIXED MOTIVE CLAIM
A.

Title VII and Price Waterhouse

The original legislative foundation for the claim described in this
Comment’s introduction is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It
declares unlawful any “employment practice” that “discriminate[s] against any
individual [ . . . ] because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.”12 In effect, Title VII sought to forbid most intentional
employment discrimination predicated on any of the protected characteristics
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.13 This statute would eventually
give rise to the framework issue, but not before additional legislation and
Supreme Court opinions significantly altered the Title VII landscape.14

11. The author does not purport to review every conceivable summary judgment framework.
Rather, Part II of the Comment summarizes the distinct approaches taken by the federal circuit
courts that have recognized and responded to this issue. See discussion infra Part II. Readers
who are also interested in frameworks beyond those adopted by any circuit can find novel
proposals among the scholarly literature on this topic. See, e.g., Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming
McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 166–67 (2007) (advocating for a new
integration of § 2000e-2(m) and the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework and contending that
all other approaches to the choice of mixed-motive frameworks “posit a false dichotomy”);
Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!”: An Essay on the Quiet Demise of
McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa into a “Mixed-Motives” Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 117–19 (2003) (arguing the pretext
framework is obsolete and re-conceptualizing the motivating factor framework to substitute
causation for unlawful intent).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
13. Some employers are exempt. By its own terms, Title VII does not apply to Indian tribes
or certain private nonprofit organizations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). In addition, an employer may
sometimes discriminate on the basis of religion, national origin, or sex where these characteristics
are part of a bona fide occupational qualification (the “BFOQ” exception). See Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977) (recognizing the BFOQ exception but describing it as
“extremely narrow”).
14. The most important of these events (the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse
and the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991) will be discussed in some detail below. See infra
notes 15–31 and accompanying text. For a concise summary, see EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
history/35th/1990s/civilrights.html (last visited June 8, 2010).
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In 1989, more than two decades after Title VII’s passage, the Supreme
Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins was called upon to decide whether an
employer who discriminated against an employee for a mixture of reasons,
some legal and some illegal, could be held liable for a violation of Title VII.15
A plurality ruled that a plaintiff could potentially hold an employer liable for
such mixed-motive discrimination where the unlawful motive (e.g., gender)
was a factor in the employment decision.16 Justice O’Connor separately
concurred in judgment but stated that the plaintiff should be obliged to show
that the unlawful motive was a substantial factor.17 Furthermore, Justice
O’Connor’s analysis demanded that the plaintiff bring direct evidence of
discrimination.18
Two points of special importance emerged from Price Waterhouse. The
first is that the case legitimized the mixed-motive analysis, which previously
had been rejected by some circuits in favor of a more stringent “but-for”
standard of causation.19 After Price Waterhouse, federal courts would no
longer treat discrimination as a simple on-or-off proposition. Rather,
employers could be held liable for adverse employment decisions fueled by a
mixture of lawful and unlawful motives, even if the plaintiff did not prove that,
“but for” the discriminatory motive, the employment decision would have been
in her favor.20
Nonetheless, the Court’s ruling gave the employer a sizeable loophole.
Even after the plaintiff met the burden of production, the employer could
escape liability by showing it would have taken the same adverse employment
action in the absence of the unlawful motive.21 If successful, this argument
was a complete affirmative defense.22

15. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 237 (plurality opinion).
16. Id. at 240 (“We take [§ 2000e-2(a)(1)] to mean that gender must be irrelevant to
employment decisions.”).
17. Id. at 265 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 276 (“[I]n order to justify shifting the burden on the issue of causation to the
defendant, a disparate treatment plaintiff must show by direct evidence that an illegitimate
criterion was a substantial factor in the decision.”). Justice O’Connor also referred to direct
evidence as “strong” evidence. Id.; see also infra note 69 and supra note 3.
19. After the plaintiff establishes the presence of an illegitimate discriminatory factor in an
employment decision, her case will still fall short of “but-for” causation if the decision
“nevertheless would have transpired in the same way” even in the absence of that factor. See
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240. Before Price Waterhouse, the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and
Seventh Circuits had nullified mixed-motive claims by requiring the plaintiff to show that the
employer’s discriminatory intent played a “but-for” role in the adverse employment decision. Id.
at 238 n.2.
20. See id. at 240.
21. The plurality and the two concurring justices agreed on this point. See id. at 244–45,
261, 276.
22. Id. at 246.
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Consequently, the Court’s plurality and concurring opinions left the
inveterate element of but-for causation partly intact, because the employer’s
affirmative defense meant that an unlawful motive could play a part in an
adverse employment decision as long as it did not control the outcome.23 In
this sense, Price Waterhouse did little more than fiddle with the burden of
proof.24 The Court’s ruling signaled that unlawful motives were permissible as
long as the employer could show that such motives fell short of “but for”
causation.
The second point of importance is that, following Price Waterhouse, most
of the lower courts adopted Justice O’Connor’s direct evidence requirement for
Mixed-motive claims based on circumstantial
mixed-motive claims.25
evidence were categorically rejected. Thus, the lower courts were not yet
required to choose between or among summary judgment frameworks
designed for circumstantial evidence,26 such as the pretext framework derived
from McDonnell Douglas v. Green.27 That fact is significant because it means
the primary issue confronted in this Comment (the choice of frameworks) lay
dormant for the time being. The situation, however, was destined to change
swiftly.

23. See id. at 240 (suggesting that the phrase “because of” in § 2000e-2(a)(1) did not mean
“but-for” causation was part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, but that the inclusion of the
employer’s affirmative defense tempered the plurality’s interpretation and made “but-for”
causation a decisive element of the mixed-motive analysis).
24. Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 309 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Price Waterhouse
involves a shift of the burden of persuasion to the defendant. In other words, under Price
Waterhouse . . . the burden of proof shifts to the employer to show that the same adverse
employment decision would have been made regardless of discriminatory animus.”).
25. Kristina N. Klein, Note, Oasis or Mirage? Desert Palace and Its Impact on the Summary
Judgment Landscape, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1177, 1184 (2006). Courts treated Justice
O’Connor’s opinion as controlling because her concurrence was thought—correctly or not—to be
the narrowest holding. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2357
(2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977))
(“[W]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys
the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’”).
26. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 397 (6th Cir. 2008) (“As mixed-motive
plaintiffs were not allowed to demonstrate their claims through circumstantial evidence, these
courts [prior to Desert Palace] did not even consider whether such plaintiffs should be required to
satisfy the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burden shifting framework in order to [survive summary
judgment].”). In other words, courts did not have to choose between McDonnell Douglas (a
framework designed earlier for single-motive claims based on circumstantial evidence) and
competing frameworks (such as the motivating factor framework crafted by the Sixth Circuit) for
mixed-motive claims until after Desert Palace.
27. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804–05 (1973). For a more detailed
explanation of McDonnell Douglas (both the case and the eponymous framework), see infra notes
40–48 and accompanying text.
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The Civil Rights Act of 1991

Displeased by Price Waterhouse, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
1991 to supersede the Supreme Court’s decision.28 In a portion later codified
as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), the Act pronounced, “Except as otherwise
provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even
though other factors also motivated the practice.”29 The “motivating factor”
language partially dispensed with the Price Waterhouse affirmative defense
and would eventually form the basis of a distinctive “motivating factor”
framework. 30
Part of the affirmative defense survived. Even after the plaintiff
established an illegitimate motive, the Act blocked most forms of monetary
relief to the plaintiff (except attorney’s fees and costs) if the employer could
carry the burden of establishing that the illegitimate motive was not a “but for”
factor in the adverse employment decision.31
C. Desert Palace: The Supreme Court Speaks?
In 2003, the Supreme Court analyzed § 2000e-2(m) in its review of a Ninth
Circuit case, Costa v. Desert Palace.32 The Ninth Circuit had affirmed the
grant of a mixed-motive jury instruction for a claim supported by

28. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(m) (2000). “The inevitable effect of the Price Waterhouse decision
is to permit prohibited employment discrimination to escape sanction under Title VII . . . .
Legislation is needed to restore Title VII’s comprehensive ban on all impermissible consideration
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in employment.” H.R. Doc. No. 102-40(I), at 46,
47–48 (1991), reprinted in Civil Rights Act of 1991, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 584, 585–86. The
Supreme Court has since declined to apply Price Waterhouse in other contexts. See Gross v. FBL
Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. ____, 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2352 (2009) (“Thus, even if Price Waterhouse
was doctrinally sound, the problems associated with its application have eliminated any
perceivable benefit to extending its framework to ADEA claims.”).
29. § 2000e-2(m).
30. Regarding the affirmative defense, see supra notes 19–24 and accompanying text. The
motivating factor language features prominently in the Sixth Circuit’s framework. See infra Part
III.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006). “[If] an individual proves a violation under §
2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the
same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court—(i) may grant
declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause (ii)), and attorney’s fees and
costs . . . and (ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission,
reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment . . . .” Id.
32. Desert Palace, Inc., v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003). At the Ninth Circuit level, the
case was Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
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circumstantial evidence.33 The Ninth Circuit’s ruling was notable for Title VII
litigants because it addressed an unresolved question: whether the trend
towards demanding direct (and not merely circumstantial) evidence for mixedmotive claims had survived the Civil Rights Act of 1991.34
After discussing the legislative history of § 2000e-2(m), the Supreme
Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling and held that plaintiffs could rely on
circumstantial evidence to support a mixed-motive claim under § 2000e2(m).35 Departing from her position in Price Waterhouse, Justice O’Connor
concurred and endorsed the use of circumstantial evidence, expressly
attributing her changed position to the legislative intent behind § 2000e-2(m).36
The Court’s ruling abrogated the demand for direct evidence previously
imposed upon plaintiffs by several of the federal circuits, which were
following Justice O’Connor’s prior concurrence in Price Waterhouse.37
As momentous as such a ruling may seem, Desert Palace focused on jury
instructions, not summary judgment frameworks, and some courts have found
this distinction meaningful.38 Yet, even if one is reluctant to accept that Desert
Palace represents a paradigm shift for summary judgment frameworks in
mixed-motive cases, one must credit Desert Palace with making the present
debate possible. Because the Court validated § 2000e-2(m) claims based on
circumstantial evidence, plaintiffs and defendants (not to mention scholars, law
students, and circuit courts) would have the chance to argue over which
circumstantial-evidence framework to apply at summary judgment.39 The next
section discusses the framework most circuits have applied in some form or
another—the “McDonnell Douglas” framework.

33. Costa, 299 F.3d at 865. The court remanded the case on an issue related to punitive
damages. Id.
34. Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 95.
35. Id. at 101–02 (“[D]irect evidence of discrimination is not required in mixed-motive
cases . . . .”).
36. Id. at 102 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I join the Court’s opinion. . . . [I]n the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Congress codified a new evidentiary rule for mixed-motive cases arising
under Title VII.”).
37. See Klein, supra note 25, at 1184.
38. The Court’s majority opinion in Desert Palace begins its analysis by stating, “This case
provides us with the first opportunity to consider the effects of the 1991 [Civil Rights] Act on
jury instructions in mixed-motive cases.” Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 98 (emphasis added).
The Eighth Circuit would later seize upon this point in Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d
733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004), to support its argument that the ramifications of Desert Palace did not
extend to summary judgment. For further development of this point, see infra note 66 and
accompanying text.
39. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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D. A Step Backwards: McDonnell Douglas and Burdine
Given the chronological progression of the above topics, this subsection’s
location may seem incongruous. Both the cases to be discussed here
(McDonnell Douglas v. Green from 1973 and Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine from 1980) predate all of the case law and legislation
discussed so far, with the exception of Title VII itself.40 The reason is simple:
it was only after Desert Palace that the framework from McDonnell Douglas
grew popular in the Title VII context.
Claims of illegal discrimination based on circumstantial evidence were
traditionally subject to the three-step burden-shifting framework established in
McDonnell Douglas v. Green.41 The McDonnell Douglas “pretext” framework
consists of three burden-shifting steps.42 First, the plaintiff must establish a
prima facie case for intentional discrimination; second, the defendant may
offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment
decision in question; third, the plaintiff must show any proffered legitimate
reason to be pretextual.43 The prima facie case is further broken down into
several components.44
In 1980, seven years after the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas
enumerated and described each of the burden-shifting steps, the Court in
Burdine added that the ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination
always rested with the plaintiff and was never transferred to the defendant.45
The Court also remarked that the burden-shifting process is designed “to bring
the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to this ultimate question [of

40. See supra notes 12, 15, 28, 32 and accompanying text.
41. See Van Detta, supra note 11, at 132 (describing the “classic circumstantial evidence
case” as “the kind to which courts since 1973 routinely applied a McDonnell Douglas analysis”).
42. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 804 (1973).
43. Id.
44. The prima facie case requires the plaintiff demonstrate that: (1) the plaintiff is a member
of a protected group; (2) the plaintiff applied for a job for which the employer was hiring and for
which the plaintiff was qualified; (3) notwithstanding the plaintiff’s qualifications, the employer
rejected the plaintiff; and (4) the position afterwards remained open. See id. at 802.
45. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1980). Below, the
Fifth Circuit had held that the defendant was obligated to establish a legitimate reason for its
employment decision by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. at 252. Even after Burdine,
courts were divided over the pretext stage. See Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step,
Burden-Shifting Approach in Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703, 714–
16, 718 (1995) (describing how courts split into at least three camps over Burdine and explaining
how the Supreme Court partially clarified Burdine in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502 (1993)).
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intentional discrimination].”46 It is supposed to do so by “[eliminating] the
most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff’s rejection.”47
In the present, scholarly discourse still ranges broadly over the merits and
defects of McDonnell Douglas.48 For the most part this Comment does not
enter that general debate. To the extent that McDonnell Douglas competes
with other frameworks in the context of § 2000e-2(m), Parts II and III of this
Comment do subject it to a limited critique.
II. POST-PALACE: THE CIRCUITS DIVERGE
A.

The Fifth Circuit: Modifying McDonnell Douglas

In 2004, the Fifth Circuit set forth its position on the framework issue in
Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., where the court ruled that the mixed-motive
analyses found in Desert Palace and Price Waterhouse were applicable to a
claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).49 Yet,
rather than falling back on the classic McDonnell Douglas test, the Fifth
Circuit forged a hybrid framework, a “modified McDonnell Douglas
approach,” for its summary judgment framework in mixed motive cases.50
Like McDonnell Douglas, this test had three steps.51 The first two were
identical to McDonnell Douglas in every way, but in the final step the court
held that “the plaintiff must . . . offer sufficient evidence to create a genuine
issue of material fact either (1) that the defendant’s reason is not true, but is
instead a pretext for discrimination (pretext alternative) or (2) that the

46. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
47. Id. at 254. That observation may seem innocuous for the moment, but it is one major
reason that McDonnell Douglas is arguably ill-suited for summary judgment motions in § 2000e2(m) cases. This point is pursued—and perhaps even belabored—in due course. See infra notes
55–63, 74–80, and accompanying text.
48. For an evidentiary framework, McDonnell Douglas arouses singularly impassioned
arguments from its detractors and supporters. See, e.g., Matthew R. Scott & Russell D. Chapman,
Much Ado About Nothing—Why Desert Palace Neither Murdered McDonnell Douglas nor
Transformed All Employment Discrimination Cases to Mixed-Motive, 36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 395,
404 (2005) (levying charges of legal “heresy” against certain critics of McDonnell Douglas);
Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Requiem for a Heavyweight: Costa as a Countermonument to McDonnell
Douglas—A Countermemory Reply to Instrumentalism, 67 ALB. L. REV. 965, 967–68 (2004)
(attributing support for McDonnell Douglas in part to “historical denial”).
49. Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 311 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that the “core
sections” of the ADEA and Title VII are almost identical). For purposes of summary judgment
analyses, the court in Rachid treated the ADEA and Title VII as practically interchangeable. See
id.
50. Id. at 312.
51. Id.
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defendant’s reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and
another ‘motivating factor’ is the plaintiff’s protected characteristic.”52
The Rachid court devoted part of its rationale to explaining why it applied
Desert Palace (a Title VII case) to an ADEA claim.53 It spared relatively little
attention to explaining why a modified McDonnell Douglas test was the best
summary judgment framework, much less how Desert Palace could have
mandated such an outcome.54 The court’s omission has not escaped the notice
of other courts and commentators.55
First, McDonnell Douglas was originally intended to smoke out a single
illegitimate motive, and thus by original design it overlooks the mixed-motive
concept altogether.56 One could argue, ipso facto, that courts should not use
McDonnell Douglas in mixed-motive cases.57 In reply to that point, some
commentators have argued that McDonnell Douglas’s original purpose does
not preclude it from also serving in a more flexible, mixed-motive role,
especially when modified to take § 2000e-2(m) into account.58 Yet, while a
showing of pretext (the third step) is optional under the Fifth Circuit approach,
the plaintiff’s prima facie case remains mandatory.59 The defendant’s task of
proffering a legitimate reason for the adverse employment decision also
endures.60 For the most part, then, any merits or defects from the first two
steps of the original McDonnell Douglas framework must survive the
transition to the modified framework. At least two specific problems are
identifiable.
First, the Fifth Circuit’s retention of the prima facie case in mixed-motive
claims is simply unnecessary. After all, the mixed-motive prong in the Fifth
Circuit’s third step ignores the defendant’s offer of a legitimate motive in the
second-step.61 The first two steps of McDonnell Douglas’s burden-shifting
become duplicative. A plaintiff who proceeds on a mixed-motive theory under
§ 2000e-2(m) should have no need for a multi-step, burden-shifting procedure.
Instead, to survive summary judgment, the plaintiff should only have to bring
52. Id. (quoting Rishel v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 854, 865 (M.D.N.C.
2003).
53. See id. at 310–12.
54. Rachid, 376 F.3d at 310–12.
55. The Sixth Circuit included Rachid among the opinions it criticized for being made
“without much, if any, consideration of the issue.” White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d
381, 398 (6th Cir. 2008).
56. See id. at 400–01.
57. See id.
58. See Klein, supra note 25, at 1196. In dicta, the Supreme Court has pointed out that
McDonnell Douglas “was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.” Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
59. Rachid, 376 F.3d at 312.
60. Id.
61. See id.
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evidence that unlawful discrimination was a motivating factor, as plainly stated
in § 2000e-2(m) itself.
An even more robust criticism of the Fifth Circuit’s prima facie case is that
it may actually prevent some plaintiffs from moving forward on a mixedmotive theory, even when the facts indicate the employer was truly motivated
in part by illegal discriminatory intent.62 The whole point of completing the
first step of the burden-shifting scheme is to eliminate the “most common
nondiscriminatory reasons” for the employer’s decision.63 Thus, under
McDonnell Douglas (original or modified), a failure to eliminate these reasons
would justify granting summary judgment to the defendant. Yet, under
§ 2000e-2(m), a plaintiff building a prima facie case should only be tasked
with showing that a discriminatory animus was a motivating factor, without
regard for whether other reasons played a part in the employer’s decision.64
Once the plaintiff carries this burden, evidence of additional,
nondiscriminatory reasons should never justify summary judgment, because
even if the employer established the partial affirmative defense permitted by
statute, “the questions of injunctive or declaratory relief and attorney fees and
costs still remain.”65
Lest this concern appear entirely theoretical, it should be noted that the
early results of Rachid are rather discouraging for plaintiffs in the Fifth Circuit.
Scholars have noted that “a search of Fifth Circuit decisions that cited Rachid
and actually applied its mixed-motive analysis reveals two decisions in which
the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court grant of summary judgment and
twenty-one decisions in which the Fifth Circuit affirmed such grants of
summary judgment.”66 The concern that the Fifth Circuit’s hybrid framework
pays only lip service to § 2000e-2(m) has some basis in fact and may be
confirmed as courts decide more cases under the modified framework.
B.

The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits: Pure McDonnell Douglas

Following the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Desert Palace, the Eighth and
Eleventh Circuits have concluded that Desert Palace did not alter the choice of
summary judgment frameworks in mixed-motive cases. In 2004, the Eighth
Circuit applied McDonnell Douglas when it affirmed a grant of summary
62. Wright v. Murray Guard, 455 F.3d 702, 717 (6th Cir. 2006).
63. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
65. Wright, 455 F.3d at 717. Naturally, the plaintiff would prefer to rebut evidence of
nondiscriminatory motivations brought by the employer, to prevent the employer from
establishing its partial affirmative defense. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). This defense, of
course, limits the range of remedies available to the plaintiff. See id. To review the elements of
the defense, see supra note 31.
66. Robert M. Weems, Selected Issues and Trends in Civil Litigation in Mississippi Federal
District Courts, 77 MISS. L.J. 977, 1032 (2008) (internal citation omitted).
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judgment to an employer–defendant in Griffith v. City of Des Moines, a mixedmotive case.67 The plaintiff in Griffith argued the court should use a modified
McDonnell Douglas framework.68 Yet, because the Supreme Court’s Desert
Palace decision only analyzed a mixed-motive jury instruction issue, the
Eighth Circuit decided that Desert Palace was “an inherently unreliable basis
for district courts to begin ignoring this Circuit’s controlling summary
judgment precedents,” which had relied exclusively on McDonnell Douglas for
circumstantial mixed-motive claims.69
The Eighth Circuit also placed considerable emphasis on the Supreme
Court’s choice to apply McDonnell Douglas in a post-Desert Palace case.70
Because the Supreme Court evidently did not intend Desert Palace to
terminate McDonnell Douglas entirely, the Eighth Circuit assumed Desert
Palace was not meant to alter the application of McDonnell Douglas at all.71
Thus, the Eighth Circuit continues to distinguish claims based on
circumstantial evidence from claims based on direct evidence. Only after
producing direct evidence can a mixed-motive plaintiff sidestep McDonnell
Douglas in the Eighth Circuit.72

67. Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 2004).
68. Id.
69. Id. The Supreme Court did not expressly address McDonnell Douglas in Desert Palace.
See Klein, supra note 25, at 1088 (“[I]f Desert Palace significantly changed the Title VII
landscape, then surely the Supreme Court would have at least cited McDonnell Douglas in its
decision.”).
70. Griffith, 387 F.3d at 735. For the post-Desert Palace case relied upon by the Eighth
Circuit, see Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 50 n.3 (2003). The plaintiff in this case
brought a claim of employment discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
not Title VII. Id. at 49. Interpretations of Title VII and other antidiscrimination statutes are
sometimes interchangeable. See Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 311 (5th Cir.
2004). But the impact of Raytheon on § 2000e-2(m) is doubtful because the ADA contains no
provision equivalent to the motivating factor standard in § 2000e-2(m). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–
17 (forbidding discrimination only “because of” a disability). For an argument urging courts to
adapt the motivating factor standard for use under the ADA, see Seam Park, Curing Causation:
Justifying a “Motivating-Factor” Standard under the ADA, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 257, 277–78
(2004). In mid-2009, the Supreme Court reviewed a similar issue for the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) but found that the ADEA does not authorize mixed-motive agediscrimination claims. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. ____, 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350
(2009).
71. Griffith, 387 F.3d at 735–36.
72. Id. at 736 (defining direct evidence as “evidence showing a specific link between the
alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision” and “evidence that clearly points to
the presence of an illegal motive”) (internal citation omitted). It is clear that the Eighth Circuit’s
notion of “direct evidence” incorporates a heightened evidentiary standard. See Id. at 736
(describing direct evidence as “strong” evidence and explaining that “‘direct’ refers to the causal
strength of the proof”). For more general remarks on direct evidence, see supra notes 3 & 18 and
accompanying text.
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The Eleventh Circuit, too, has apparently retained McDonnell Douglas as
its sole Title VII summary judgment framework for claims based on
circumstantial evidence. In the 2004 case Burstein v. Emtel, the Eleventh
Circuit effectively joined the Eighth Circuit’s position, albeit with a more
subdued tone.73 An unpublished opinion, Burstein never acknowledged Desert
Palace or the ongoing debate over summary judgment frameworks. Instead,
the court simply noted, “In cases involving circumstantial evidence of
discrimination . . . under Title VII . . . courts use the analytical framework set
forth in McDonnell Douglas v. Green . . . which requires the plaintiff first to
demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation.”74
In the preceding year, the Eleventh Circuit had grappled with Desert
Palace more directly in Cooper v. Southern Company and emerged with a
relatively clear allegiance to McDonnell Douglas.75 Yet, Cooper was not a
mixed-motive case. The court underscores this fact but dodges the question of
whether it would have used McDonnell Douglas at summary judgment if the
Cooper plaintiff had expressly relied on a mixed-motive theory rather than a
single-motive theory.76
The central criticism levied at the Eight and Eleventh Circuits is that the
courts blatantly misconstrue Desert Palace by ignoring the obvious
implications of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in that case. The Court
repeatedly stated that a mixed-motive theory imposes no special or heightened
evidentiary requirement, as compared to the requirements of single-motive
theory.77 Yet, the burden on a plaintiff under McDonnell Douglas is higher
than under a simple motivating factor framework, because McDonnell Douglas
requires plaintiffs to not only eliminate nondiscriminatory reasons for the
employment decision, but to also present evidence of a discriminatory
reason.78 Consequently, by applying McDonnell Douglas to claims brought
under § 2000e-2(m), the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits are applying a

73. Burstein v. Emtel, Inc., No. 04-12841, 2005 WL 1370122, at *208 (11th Cir. June 8,
2005).
74. Id. A footnote in the opinion also discusses the plaintiff’s failure to bring “direct”
evidence of discrimination, which is a meaningful requirement only if the court was in accord
with the Eighth Circuit. Id. at 208 n.6.
75. See Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 (11th Cir. 2004).
76. See id. at 725 n.17. Like the Eighth Circuit, the court also points to the lack of attention
McDonnell Douglas received in Desert Palace. Id.
77. See Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98, 101 (2003). As one commentator put it,
“Desert Palace is not merely a ‘jury instruction’ case . . . but, rather, [it] establishes an entirely
new avenue for plaintiffs to circumstantially prove a case of discrimination using a mixed-motive
analysis.” Weems, supra note 66, at 1029.
78. One Sixth Circuit judge used this line of reasoning when he described the McDonnell
Douglas framework as “more stringent” than a simple motivating factor framework. White v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 411 (6th Cir. 2008) (Gilman, J., concurring).
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heightened evidentiary standard contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Desert Palace.79
A brief hypothetical illustrates the effect of this stance. If a plaintiff brings
a mixed-motive theory based on circumstantial evidence in one of these two
circuits, he or she is automatically subjected to McDonnell Douglas when the
defendant files a motion for summary judgment.80 If the plaintiff can establish
a prima facie case, the defendant will then proffer a legitimate reason and
argue that this reason would have led to the same decision in the absence of the
alleged discriminatory motive.81 At the third stage, the plaintiff is forced to
rebut the employer’s proffered reason—i.e., expose it as pretext—even though
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ostensibly guarantees the plaintiff some measure
of relief whether or not the employer’s proffered reason is pretextual.82 If
unable to show pretext, the plaintiff is completely cut off from statutory relief
by this arbitrary evidentiary scheme.83
C. The Fourth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits: Motivating Factor or McDonnell
Douglas
The following subsections describe the developments in the Fourth, Ninth,
and D.C. Circuits, using the Fourth Circuit’s analysis as the primary
illustration of their shared standards. In McGinest v. GTE Service Corp.
(2002)84 and Fogg v. Gonzales (2007),85 the Ninth Circuit and D.C. Circuit,
respectively, have taken positions practically identical to the one set forth by
the Fourth Circuit.

79. See Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 98–99.
80. See, e.g., Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004).
81. To review the basic McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting process, see supra notes 40–48
and accompanying text.
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006).
83. “[T]he approach of the Eighth and Eleventh circuits will almost inevitably prevent
plaintiffs in those circuits from exercising the circumstantial mixed-motive option which the
Supreme Court’s decision in Desert Palace provided to them.” Weems, supra note 66, at 1030.
“The [McDonnell Douglas] burden-shifting approach, in theory if not in practice, is frequently
inconsistent with the Civil Rights Act of 1991.” Davis, supra note 45, at 745.
84. As the Ninth Circuit concluded, “[W]hen responding to a summary judgment motion, the
plaintiff is presented with a choice regarding how to establish his or her case. [The plaintiff] may
proceed by using the McDonnell Douglas framework, or alternatively, may simply produce direct
or circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a discriminatory reason more likely than not
motivated [the defendant-employer].” McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th
Cir. 2002).
85. Fogg v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 447, 451 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The D.C. Circuit departs
superficially from its sister circuits when it refers to the motivating factor test as a “motivating
part” or “substantial factor” test. Id. While the latter term smacks of a heightened evidentiary
standard, the Fogg court later adheres to the plain “motivating factor” language from § 2000e2(m). See id. at 453.
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As exemplified in Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Co., the
Fourth Circuit permits § 2000e-2(m) plaintiffs a choice: at summary judgment,
they may proceed either by surviving McDonnell Douglas or by presenting
evidence sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact over whether the
defendant’s adverse employment decision was motivated, at least in part, by an
illegitimate discriminatory factor.86 Plaintiffs do not have to meet a heightened
evidentiary standard of the sort seen in the Eighth Circuit. Rather, plaintiffs
“can survive a motion for summary judgment by presenting direct or
circumstantial evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether an impermissible factor such as race motivated the employer’s adverse
employment decision.”87
While likely preferable to the alternatives available in the Eighth or Fifth
Circuits, the open choice between McDonnell Douglas and a motivating factor
framework is perhaps an unnecessary one. Given that McDonnell Douglas
places a greater burden on plaintiffs, informed plaintiffs should consistently
select a motivating factor framework.88 Yet, if nothing else, retaining an openminded position has kept the above circuits somewhat clear of the fray.89 It is
difficult to criticize such a flexible framework.
Still, one potential criticism of these circuits’ laissez-faire approach is that
it creates confusion, because plaintiffs are not clearly directed to choose
between a mixed-motive and single-motive theory before summary judgment.
From the D.C. Circuit, Fogg v. Gonzales90 provides a specific example in
which the plaintiff’s indecision stymied the lower court.91 After the defendant
filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the judge finally settled upon a
single-motive theory, with McDonnell Douglas as the accompanying

86. This standard is found in Fogg, 492 F.3d at 454; Diamond v. Colonial Life & Ins. Co.,
416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2005); McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1122.
87. Diamond, 416 F.3d at 318.
88. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
89. Judge Moore’s concurring opinion in Wright dismissed the Fifth Circuit, excoriated the
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, but only implicitly disagreed with the Fourth, Ninth, and D.C.
circuits by advising the Sixth Circuit to exclude McDonnell Douglas from mixed-motive claims.
See Wright v. Murray Guard, 455 F.3d 702, 717–20 (6th Cir. 2006) (Moore, J., concurring). The
author has found no courts and few commentators who focus direct criticism on the Fourth,
Ninth, or D.C. circuits. But see Katz, supra note 11, at 164–66 (repudiating the “choice” camp
and situating the pretext and motivating factor frameworks to serve complementary, rather than
competing, roles in mixed motive claims).
90. Fogg, 492 F.3d at 451.
91. See Borcherding, supra note 9, at 263 (noting that the standard for determining whether
a plaintiff should survive a motion for judgment as a matter of law is “the same as the standard
for defeating a motion for summary judgment . . . .”) (quoting Dunbar v. Pepsi-Cola Gen.
Bottlers, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1195 (N.D. Iowa 2003); see also Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
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framework, merely because the defendant’s motion mentioned pretext.92
Ironically, the defendant did not wish the trial court to use a pretext framework
and argued on appeal in favor of eliminating the distinction between mixedmotive and single-motive frameworks.93 Although the D.C. Circuit reversed
portions of the lower court’s ruling, it found no abuse of discretion in the trial
judge’s selection of a theory for the parties based on the defendant’s chance
mention of pretext.94
Admittedly, the questions of who chooses how to classify the complaint
(i.e., as proceeding under § 2000e-2(m) or under a single-motive theory) and
when that choice must be made are not entirely unique to these circuits. Their
approach merely seems to invite the most confusion over choice and timing.95
To ameliorate the problem, these circuits could at least make one framework
the default standard for cases where the plaintiff’s choice is unclear.96
A second potential criticism originates from those commentators who
consider McDonnell Douglas either entirely “superfluous”97 in light of the
motivating factor test or “dead”98 in the wake of Desert Palace. They would
prefer these circuits to do away with McDonnell Douglas altogether and leave
plaintiffs with the motivating factor framework for both single and mixedmotive theories. Yet, that position is probably too extreme, given that the

92. Fogg, 492 F.3d at 451. The oddity in this case arises from the fact that plaintiffs should
choose the theory, as the opinion itself seems to recognize. See id. at 451 (explaining that “[u]sing
the mixed-motive theory, a plaintiff can establish an unlawful employment practice . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
93. Id. at 452–53.
94. Id. at 454.
95. By contrast, in the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, the choice of theories and the timing of
that choice are irrelevant, because the courts there apply a traditional pretext framework to all
Title VII claims based on circumstantial evidence, regardless of whether the claims are brought
pursuant to § 2000e-2(m) or Title VII’s general antidiscrimination provision, § 2000e-2(a)(1).
See supra notes 64–73 and accompanying text. Somewhat similarly, a Fifth Circuit plaintiff
theoretically ought to be able to proceed under § 2000e-2(m) by default, and so a judge would
never be left with the awkward task of gleaning the plaintiff’s theory from the parties’ briefs. See
supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. The Sixth Circuit’s approach may raise some
questions in this area. See infra Part III.
96. Ideally, the default standard would be the motivating factor framework, whose
advantages over the pretext framework are a central point of discussion in this article. See infra
notes 127–40 and accompanying text. If a plaintiff did not prefer the default framework, the
plaintiff could make that clear through the same means by which the plaintiff identifies the
complaint as proceeding on a mixed or single-motive theory. See infra notes 148–49 and
accompanying text.
97. Davis, supra note 45, at 752.
98. Van Detta, supra note 48, at 966. One district court has adopted this expansive view, at
least with regard to Title VII. See Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 991–92
(D. Minn. 2003) (finding that McDonnell Douglas no longer applied to single or mixed-motive
theories after Desert Palace).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2010]

MIXED MOTIVES AND MOTIVATING FACTORS

1455

Supreme Court continues to make use of McDonnell Douglas in some contexts
after Desert Palace.99
As the Supreme Court had cautioned, Desert Palace did not require the
Court to decide if the motivating factor test applied outside the mixed-motive
context.100 With that question undecided, the motivating factor framework is
probably not yet ready to supplant McDonnell Douglas in every Title VII
claim. A more modest argument is that within the mixed-motive context, a
simple “motivating factor” framework should replace McDonnell Douglas.
That is precisely the stance taken by the Sixth Circuit, as explained in the
following section.
III. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT TAKES A STAND: THE MOTIVATING FACTOR
FRAMEWORK
A.

Pre-White: Evading the Issue

For a few years following Desert Palace, the Sixth Circuit managed to
avoid the prickly question of how to unravel Desert Palace’s abolishment of
the distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence, for purposes of
evaluating mixed-motive claims.
In 2005, one unpublished opinion
acknowledged the issue but refused to resolve it.101 Another unpublished
opinion from the same year suggested that a modified pretext framework,
similar to the Fifth Circuit’s hybrid, would be the best choice.102
Later still, in the 2006 case Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., the majority
opinion noted that Desert Palace presented an unresolved question regarding
summary judgment frameworks and circumstantial mixed-motive claims.103
Unfortunately, the majority opinion avoided settling the question of Desert
Palace’s impact on the choice of frameworks.104 The court clearly averred that
it was simply persisting in the same analysis it would have used for a mixedmotive claim supported by direct evidence before Desert Palace.105 It did not
decide whether mixed-motive theories supported by circumstantial evidence
ought to be analyzed with a pretext framework, as discrimination claims
supported by circumstantial evidence traditionally were.106
The more helpful analysis in Wright originates in the concurring opinion
by Judge Moore (who also authored the majority opinion).107 Not only did her
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 n.1 (2003).
Harris v. Giant Eagle, 133 F. App’x 288, 297 (6th Cir. 2005).
Aquino v. Honda of Am., 158 F. App’x 667, 675–76 (6th Cir. 2005).
Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 712 (6th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 712 n.4.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 704, 716.
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concurring opinion undertake a thorough review of the frameworks in other
circuits, but it also clearly articulated how the Sixth Circuit should respond to
Desert Palace on the issue of summary judgment frameworks for
circumstantial mixed-motive claims.108 Judge Moore’s opinion prefigured the
majority holding in White v. Baxter and formed the backbone of that decision,
which this Comment examines next.109 Most of the essential points from
Judge Moore’s Wright concurrence reappear in the White opinion.110
B.

White v. Baxter: The Motivating Factor Framework Is Born

In 2005, a pharmaceutical salesman named Todd White filed suit against
his employer, Baxter Healthcare Corporation, for violations of Title VII and a
Michigan state statute, the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act.111 He alleged
employment discrimination based on his male gender and African–American
race.112 This discrimination was supposedly shown by (1) Baxter’s refusal to
promote White to a sales manager position, (2) the downgrading of his sales
performance and a consequent diminution of his 2004 raise, and (3) a denial of
company benefits.113 After the district court granted Baxter’s motions for
summary judgment, White appealed but abandoned the gender discrimination
claim and the challenge to lost benefits.114 Furthermore, White’s challenge of
the refusal-to-promote was grounded on a single-motive theory.115
Consequently, when the Sixth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary
judgment, the only mixed-motive theory before it was the salary-reduction
challenge, accompanied by the following facts.116
To evaluate employees in 2004, Baxter had set up a table (“the Grid”)
categorizing various products and the degree of success salespersons would
need in each product area to earn a “passing” grade.117 Salespersons would
receive a salary raise commensurate with their level of performance; those at
the very bottom would receive no raise at all.118 Previously, White had
achieved outstanding performance reviews in his six years with Baxter, but in

108. Wright, 455 F.3d at 716–20 (Moore, J., concurring).
109. See White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 397–402 (6th Cir. 2008).
110. However, the White opinion lacks some relevant criticisms articulated in Wright. See
infra text accompanying notes 144–149.
111. White, 533 F.3d at 385, 389.
112. Id. at 389.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 390.
116. See White, 533 F.3d at 395.
117. Id. at 387–88. Baxter organized the results of the evaluations along a spectrum. At the
top was “Exceeds,” followed by “Meets [Expectations] Plus,” “Meets,” “Meets Minus,” and
“Does Not Meet.” Id.
118. Id. at 388.
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2004, White’s regional manager (Phillips) found that White’s sales
performance deserved the lowest score on the Grid, though he raised the final
grade by one rank, supposedly in acknowledgment of White’s past superior
performance.119 As a result, Baxter did raise White’s salary in 2004, but the
increase was smaller than it would have been if White had scored higher on the
Grid.120 A plain reading of the Grid revealed that White’s performance should
have placed him in the intermediate grade: one rank above the grade awarded
him by Phillips.121 On the other hand, Baxter had set additional goals for
White and certain other salespersons to increase sales of a specific drug, and
White had concededly failed to meet those added goals.122
Still, White introduced evidence that the Grid was a more recent standard
than the personalized goals and should have overridden the latter, as well as
evidence that other employees were evaluated under the Grid’s terms only.123
Furthermore, White had produced evidence that Phillips had made disparaging
remarks about black male employees.124 Phillips had also sent an email to
multiple employees, containing an off-color joke which connected Osama bin
Laden to O.J. Simpson.125
With these facts, the Sixth Circuit had to decide whether Baxter had been
entitled to summary judgment on White’s mixed-motive theory.126 The court
reversed the grant of summary judgment.127 First, from Phillips’s behavior, the
court found a reasonable jury could have inferred discriminatory animus.128
Second, given that employees other than White had apparently been evaluated
under the Grid’s standards alone (and not with additional goals in mind), the
court found a reasonable jury could conclude Phillips’s rating choice was
motivated at least in part by his discriminatory animus.129
Most importantly for this Comment’s purposes, the court finally selected
its post-Desert Palace framework for circumstantial mixed-motive claims at
summary judgment.130 After another extensive review of the various
frameworks followed by other circuits, the Sixth Circuit validated Judge
Moore’s concurrence from Wright by holding that “the McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine burden-shifting framework does not apply to the summary

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 385–86, 388.
Id. at 389.
See White, 533 F.3d. at 388.
See id. at 387–88.
See id. at 405.
Id. at 385.
Id.
See White, 533 F.3d at 390.
Id. at 406.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 405–06.
Id. at 400.
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judgment analysis of Title VII mixed-motive claims.”131 Rather, “[T]o survive
a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, a Title VII plaintiff asserting a
mixed-motive claim need only produce evidence sufficient to convince a jury
that: (1) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff;
and (2) ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating
factor . . . .’”132
The court naturally focused part of its discussion on the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of § 2000e-2(m) in Desert Palace.133 With the distinction
between direct and circumstantial evidence erased for mixed-motive cases, the
Sixth Circuit saw no cause to withhold the “motivating factor” standard
inherent to § 2000e-2(m) from plaintiffs whose claims were supported by
circumstantial evidence, rather than direct evidence.134 After all, the pure
motivating factor framework had always been applicable to claims based on
direct evidence.135 Following Desert Palace, the rationale for segregating
frameworks had vanished along with the distinction between direct and
circumstantial evidence.136
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit was concerned that McDonnell Douglas was
ill-suited for mixed-motive claims.137 The pretext framework’s purpose, as
identified by the Supreme Court in Burdine, was “‘to bring litigants and the
court . . . to [the] ultimate question’ of whether the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff.”138 That purpose was accomplished “by
‘smok[ing] out the single, ultimate reason for the adverse employment
decision.’”139
As the Sixth Circuit understood, a mixed-motive theory by nature never
requires smoking out a single, ultimate reason.140 Once a mixed-motive
plaintiff has brought evidence of an illegitimate motivating factor, the plaintiff

131. White, 533 F.3d at 400.
132. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 397.
136. See White, 533 F.3d at 400.
137. Id. at 400–01.
138. Id. at 400 (quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1980)).
139. Id. (quoting Wright v. Murray Guard, 455 F.3d 702, 720 (6th Cir. 2006)); see also supra
note 35 and accompanying text.
140. This point echoes Justice Brennan’s opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, 247 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1074, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). He argued that
“[w]here a decision was the product of a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives . . . it
simply makes no sense to ask whether the legitimate reason was the ‘true reason’ for the
decision—which is the question asked by Burdine.” Id. (citation omitted). Or as one
commentator put it, “The [McDonnell Douglas/Burdine] scheme was born out of the notion that
Title VII cases required proof of but-for, or sole-factor, causation.” Klein, supra note 25, at 1182.
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has no responsibility to eliminate the employer’s proffered legitimate reason
for the adverse employment decision, because no amount of legitimate reasons
can entirely offset the illegitimate motivating factor.141 At most, legitimate
reasons may afford the defendant a limited affirmative defense, which the
defendant is burdened with establishing.142 As the Sixth Circuit concluded, the
plaintiff should not be saddled with the pretext framework and the added
burden of rebutting a proffered legitimate reason.143
C. Post-White: What the Sixth Circuit Missed
If the White opinion suffered any particular weakness, it was the court’s
failure to expressly reiterate Judge Moore’s observation in Wright that the
pretext framework might unjustly terminate some mixed-motive claims at
summary judgment.144 Instead, the court mostly spoke of McDonnell Douglas
as “not needed” and “unnecessary.”145 The opinion also left a small role for
McDonnell Douglas to play in mixed-motive cases.146 The court observed that
plaintiffs might wish to use part of the McDonnell Douglas prima face case
(the first step in the burden-shifting process).147
For all that, the court still emphasized that “compliance with the
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine shifting burdens of production is not
required . . . .”148 Under these circumstances, the court added, summary
judgment would typically be inappropriate because inquiries into an
employer’s motivations are “very fact intensive.”149

141. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
143. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 401 (6th Cir. 2008).
144. Wright v. Murray Guard, 455 F.3d 702, 717 (6th Cir. 2006). These are the same
concerns critics of the Eighth Circuit have voiced. See supra notes 74–83 and accompanying
text.
145. White, 533 F.3d at 400–01.
146. Id. at 400 n.10. As an aside, the court observed that McDonnell Douglas was still the
appropriate framework for single-motive claims (i.e., claims proceeding under 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(1) when based on circumstantial evidence). Id.
147. Id. at 401. Normally, establishing the prima facie case in the pretext framework creates a
presumption of discriminatory animus unless the defendant offers a legitimate reason for its
conduct. Id. at 400–01. But it is not entirely clear from the White opinion whether a
§ 2000e-2(m) plaintiff who chose to invoke and establish the prima facie case from McDonnell
Douglas would still be able to benefit from this presumption. In a more recent case from the
Sixth Circuit, the court did not expressly mention any presumption but acknowledged “[t]he fact
that [the plaintiff] has established a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework
can be considered in favor of his mixed-motive claims.” Graham v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 298 F.
App’x 487, 495 (6th Cir. 2008).
148. White, 533 F.3d at 401.
149. Id. at 402.
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Possibly, a second deficiency in the court’s opinion is that it ignored the
question of how the choice of theories (mixed or single) is made and when that
choice must be made. While it may seem to be a mechanical issue, the
labeling of a claim as proceeding under § 2000e-2(m) or § 2000e-2(a)(1) is
important because it determines which framework the court should employ at
summary judgment.150 Ideally, plaintiffs should identify the theory in the
complaint or at least in any briefs filed in opposition to the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment.151 They could also discuss the issue at a pretrial
conference.152 These practical precautions would ensure that trial courts apply
the motivating factor framework whenever a plaintiff intends to proceed under
§ 2000e-2(m).
IV. CHOOSING A FRAMEWORK: EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
This section adds support for the Sixth Circuit’s motivating factor
framework, with special attention paid to empirical evidence. As some
scholars have put it, “[When] legal doctrines rely on stated or unstated theories
about the nature of real world phenomena . . . those theories should remain
consistent with advances in relevant fields of empirical inquiry.”153 The
evidence will show that the motivating factor framework fits the facts of
discrimination just as well as it fits the text and function of § 2000e-2(m).
A.

Multiple Motivations and Empirical Reality

In Price Waterhouse, Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion explained that an
employer’s adverse decision is discriminatory if the plaintiff’s protected status
consciously influences the employer’s decision, to the point that the employer
would state at the moment of decision (if asked and if honest) that the
protected status was a reason for its decision.154 Apparently, the plurality
thought that illegal discrimination had to play a calculated role in the
employer’s decision, a notion that has been perpetuated with every rote

150. The court in Hernandez v. Earth Tech, Inc., 2008 WL 4104366, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug.
29, 2008) drove this point home for the plaintiff when it refused to apply the motivating factor
framework from White v. Baxter, because the plaintiff had “never advanced a mixed-motive
theory of recovery in any of his submissions [to the court].”
151. Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
152. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(A).
153. Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1001 (2006);
see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil
Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 776 (2007) (“More social science and expert testimony
could illuminate the interrelationship of fact and law in gender [discrimination] cases.”).
154. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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recitation of the “ultimate question” in disparate treatment cases.155 Whether
as a result of the Supreme Court’s view of discrimination or for other reasons,
unconscious discrimination has tended to escape judicial scrutiny under Title
VII.156
Yet, social-psychological research has shown that illegitimate
discrimination can flourish at a less-than-conscious level in the workplace.157
According to such research, recognizing discrimination only when it is blatant
and overt “ignores how discrimination actually works in many situations and
leaves much discrimination untouched.”158 To detect discrimination, an
observer must understand that an employer’s illegitimate motivation may
consist of a preexisting “biased mental state.”159 Illegitimate discrimination in
the form of, for example, racial bias may be more implicit than explicit, and
focusing solely on overt forms of intent will cause courts to overlook a great
deal of discrimination.160 This is not to say that acts of discrimination in such
cases are necessarily unintentional. As one social psychologist has explained:
“[P]eople probably can help it when they stereotype and prejudge. . . .
Because perceivers have options available, they may be said to intend the one
they choose.”161
Based on the empirical data regarding the nature of discrimination, one can
draw certain conclusions about multiple motivations. When discrimination
consists of stereotypes, in part, and operates beneath the level of purposeful
intent, it follows that other motivations must also play a part in these
discriminatory decisions, so that the actor’s conduct appears at first blush to be
155. That is, the question of whether the employer intentionally discriminated for an
illegitimate reason. See e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143
(2000).
156. Franita Tolson, The Boundaries of Litigating Unconscious Discrimination: Firm-Based
Remedies in Response to a Hostile Judiciary, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 347, 347 (2008) (“While
unconscious discrimination is actionable under Title VII (presumably), scholars are in agreement
that court regulation of it has failed.”). But not all courts have ignored the issue. See, e.g.,
Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 58 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that racial
discrimination in employee evaluations was illegitimate “regardless of whether the employer
consciously intended to base the evaluations on race, or simply did so because of unthinking
stereotypes or bias.”).
157. See Tolson, supra note 156, at 356 (“The persistence of unconscious discrimination in
the workplace has been documented in numerous studies.”).
158. Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implications of Psychological Research Related to
Unconscious Discrimination and Implicit Bias in Proving Intentional Discrimination, 73 MO. L.
REV. 83, 99 (2008) (applying social cognition theory to Title VII and other antidiscrimination
statutes).
159. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 153, at 1056–57.
160. Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1128 (2008).
161. Susan T. Fiske, Examining the Role of Intent: Toward Understanding Its Role in
Stereotyping and Prejudice, in UNINTENDED THOUGHT: THE LIMITS OF AWARENESS 253, 277
(James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh eds., 1989).
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motivated solely by legitimate reasons residing closer to the surface of his
cognition. That is to say, the type of submerged discrimination that is left
untouched by conventional legal wisdom must be accompanied by reasons that
appear legitimate, in order to be less than blatant and overt.162 Superficially
legitimate motivations for adverse employment decisions are logically the only
means by which biased mental states163 can operate while remaining
undetected.
The psychological theory of aversive (i.e., subtle) racism illustrates this
reasoning:
[A]versive racists will not discriminate when ‘the appropriate decision is
obvious,’ such as where a candidate for a position is clearly qualified or not
qualified; however, where the appropriate decision is not clear “because of
ambiguous evidence about . . . the candidate’s qualifications . . . bias is
expected.” In the latter situation, “the aversive racist can justify or rationalize
164
a negative response on the basis of some factor other than race.”

In the aversive racism scenario, the candidate’s ambiguous qualifications
would potentially be a legitimate (albeit superficial) motivating factor for an
adverse employment decision, while the aversive racism itself would be an
illegitimate motivating factor.
Overall, these types of theories suggest that multiple motivations are at
work in many illegitimate discriminatory decisions, including adverse
employment decisions. While that would not be true of every case, decisions
openly motivated by discrimination are relatively rare, as previously noted.165
Most of the time, courts and parties must deal with subtler forms of alleged
discrimination. And it is here that multiple motives likely flourish.166
B.

The Need for a “Motivating Factor” Framework

The situation described in the preceding section is plainly well-suited for
an application of § 2000e-2(m).167 Yet, in order for the statute to function
properly—in order for the law to counter intentional discrimination
effectively—frameworks in conflict with the reality of multiple motivations
cannot be permitted to smother the plaintiff’s claim at summary judgment.
162. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
164. Bodensteiner, supra note 158, at 101–02 (quoting John F. Dovidio et al., Contemporary
Racial Bias: When Good People Do Bad Things, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GOOD AND
EVIL 141, 145, 148 (Arthur G. Miller ed., 2004)).
165. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
166. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Intuitive Psychologist Behind the Bench: Models of Gender
Bias in Social Psychology and Employment Discrimination Law, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 835, 846
(2004) (“[I]t is reasonable to expect that most subtle discrimination cases will be mixed motive
cases.”).
167. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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Instead, courts should choose a framework that comports with the complexity
of discrimination.168
The motivating factor framework selected by the Sixth Circuit draws
directly from the language of the statute and thus avoids impeding or cutting
off valid claims at summary judgment.169 Conversely, as discussed in Parts II
and III, the pretext frameworks used by most other circuits clash with a plain
reading of § 2000e-2(m)170 and unrealistically presuppose a single,
discriminatory motive, which, in reality, is less prevalent than an intermingling
of legitimate and illegitimate biases.171 By following the Sixth Circuit’s lead,
courts can avoid the “endless confusion”172 of issues engendered by the pretext
frameworks and also ensure that they are allowing § 2000e-2(m) to combat
unlawful discrimination, even discrimination that might lurk beneath legitimate
motivations.
Ideally, social-psychological research will not only reach lawyers and the
courts, but also permeate society’s understanding of discrimination.173 As
plaintiffs and their attorneys become more aware of how discrimination works,
they may be expected to ground their complaints more frequently in § 2000e2(m).174 In these cases, courts should follow the trend set by the Sixth Circuit
and use a motivating factor framework, because it alone is capable of weeding
out any illegitimate motivation, even when that motivation is intermingled with
ostensibly lawful reasons for the adverse employment decision. Subtle or

168. Significant progress in combating discrimination could be made if “proof schemes
developed by the courts [are] revisited and modified to reflect the current understanding [of
discrimination]” in the social sciences. Bodensteiner, supra note 158, at 127.
169. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 55–63, 74–80, 134–40, and accompanying text.
171. See Bodensteiner, supra note 158, at 103.
172. Davis, supra note 45, at 705; see also Krieger, supra note 166, at 838 (noting the
profound consequences of differing pretext frameworks provided by the Seventh Circuit and
Supreme Court).
173. Of course, the nature of discrimination is not perfectly clear yet. See Rachel F. Moran,
The Elusive Nature of Discrimination, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2365, 2418 (2003) (book review)
(admitting “it is hard to say precisely what discrimination means.”). However, the very theories
discussed in this article show that knowledge of discrimination is growing, and modern
educational institutions can pass that knowledge on to society at large. See, e.g., NATIONAL
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, SOCIAL JUSTICE: STRATEGIES, http://www.nea.org/tools/18848.htm
(last visited June 8, 2010) (urging educators—of which it claims 3.2 million as members—to
“[u]nderstand the mechanisms that perpetuate oppression”).
174. Long before White v. Baxter, Congress seems to have believed § 2000e-2(m) would
prove popular amongst plaintiffs. In its explanation for why the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was
needed, the House of Representatives agreed with the Justice Department that “virtually every
Title VII disparate treatment case will to some degree entail multiple motives.” H.R. REP. No.
102-40(I), at 47 (1991) as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 585.
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otherwise, no form of illegitimate employment discrimination should evade
§ 2000e-2(m).175
C. Why Some Courts Overlook Empirical Research
Regrettably, courts often overlook the results of empirical research
concerning the nature of bias and discrimination.176 The absence of such
considerations in most of the preceding cases is telling. Even the Sixth
Circuit’s opinion in White v. Baxter is devoid of social–psychological studies
or concern for how the various frameworks might be more or less preferable
from a social sciences perspective. Instead, it concentrates exclusively on
narrow legal analysis of the Desert Palace and McDonnell Douglas
frameworks.177 Yet, if § 2000e-2(m) is to work properly, it is vital for courts
to make empirically informed decisions about which summary judgment
framework to utilize. They cannot do so if they ignore what the social sciences
have to say about discriminatory behavior.
One possible difficulty is that many judges fail to capture the “insider”
perspective on discrimination.178 Comfortable with their own perceptions of
reality and with purely legal concepts of discrimination, they may see little
need to rely on the social sciences. Yet, if judges were made aware (perhaps
by plaintiffs)179 of advances in the social sciences, they would be able to detect
the subtler strands of discrimination in employers’ behavior, mixed in with
whatever legitimate reasons the employer may offer for an adverse
employment decision. That would be a patent improvement for claims under
§ 2000e-2(m) at summary judgment, where judges must apply the frameworks
analyzed in this Comment.

175. After all, § 2000e-2(m) was designed to catch forms of discrimination that had
previously escaped sanction under Price Waterhouse. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
One of the “primary purposes” of § 2000e-2(m) was “to provide more effective deterrence.” H.R.
REP. No. 102-40(I), at 1 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 552.
176. See Bodensteiner, supra note 158, at 99 (“[M]ost reported decisions addressing proof of
discrimination do not address theories of human behavior . . . .”); Krieger, supra note 166, at 835
(likewise asserting that “courts do not appear to be cognizant of recent advances in cognitive
social psychology”). However, plaintiffs can still sometimes put expert socio-psychological
testimony to good use. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989), the Supreme
Court acknowledged and discussed the social-psychological trial testimony of Dr. Fiske. See
generally Susan T. Fiske et al., Social Science Research on Trial: Use of Sex Stereotyping
Research in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1049 (1991).
177. See White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 400 (6th Cir. 2008).
178. Robinson, supra note 160, at 1157 (explaining that the phenomenon of perceptual
segregation “pits the plaintiff’s subjective perception against the judge’s own subjective
perception, and the law privileges the latter”).
179. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
As a social phenomenon, discrimination is still widespread, but part of the
solution may be as simple as adjusting the types of frameworks courts use at
summary judgment in employment discrimination cases. Specifically, in cases
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), courts should use a motivating factor
framework, not only because the framework conforms to Supreme Court
precedent in Desert Palace, but also because it “fits the facts” of
discrimination.180 The motivating factor framework is essential to the proper
application of the statute, and in light of the prevalence of multiple motivations
and the volume of claims that may be based on § 2000e-2(m) following
decisions like White v. Baxter, it is all the more critical for courts to choose the
right framework at summary judgment.
THOMAS F. KONDRO*

180. “The first call of a theory of law is that it should fit the facts.” OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 211 (1938).
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